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Covenants Not to Sue Provide Less Immunity
in a Post-MedImmune World
EDO ROYKER*
The primary focus of this Note is to address the impact of the totality of circumstances
test, as now adopted by the Federal Circuit, on covenants not to sue. Under the old
reasonable apprehension test, promises not to sue were given greater weight than under
the new totality of the circumstances test. Part I of this Note will address the new totality
of the circumstances test under Medlmmune and SanDisk. Part II of this Note will
begin by analyzing the application of promises not to sue prior to the Medlmmune and
SanDisk decisions and then compare the weight given to the same promises in a post-
MedImmune world. Although the current case law does not indicate an extreme
change from the pre-Medlmmune decisions, the dicta in these cases indicates that a
more extreme change may be forthcoming. Finally, Part III will respond to a number
of scholarly articles that have indicated disapproval of the Federal Circuit's application
of the totality of the circumstances test and explain why such criticism may be called for
in certain situations but not in others. More specifically, Part III will explore four
potential bargaining scenarios between hypothetical licensors and licensees, and will
apply a twofold analysis taking into account exposed revenue and burdensome
litigation costs. The article concludes that if the primary purpose of a company is to
develop technology, rather than to generate revenue through an aggressive licensing
plan, then the new declaratory judgment standard will help such companies operate
without fear of faulty license demands.
[4731
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INTRODUCTION
The Declaratory Judgment Act' provides courts with Article III
jurisdiction to "declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration" in "cases of actual
controversy." 2 The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to
provide certainty to parties who believe that their conduct may subject
them to litigation.3 Not surprisingly, the most controversial component in
analyzing a declaratory judgment action is whether or not an actual
controversy exists.
The difficulty in determining the existence of an actual controversy
is even more pronounced in the patent infringement context, as
illustrated by the Supreme Court's rejection of the Federal Circuit's
reasonable-apprehension test.4 Until recently, the Federal Circuit applied
a two-part test to determine the existence of an actual controversy that
focused on the conduct of both the patentee and the alleged infringer.
Under this two-part test, an actual controversy exists if there is both
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2oo6).
2. Id. § 2201(a); see U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
3. BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F-3d 975, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that
the purpose of the declaratory judgment act is to enable a person who is at legal risk because of an
unresolved issue to obtain resolution of the issue without waiting for the other side to initiate
litigation).
4. See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. is8. 132 n.II (2007).
5. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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(i) .. . explicit threat or other action by the patentee which creates a
reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment
plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity by
the declaratory judgment plaintiff which could constitute infringement,
or concrete steps taken by the6 declaratory judgment plaintiff with the
intent to conduct such activity.
In the dicta of footnote i i of the MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc. decision, the Supreme Court criticized the reasonable-apprehension
test adopted by the Federal Circuit.' Instead the Court followed a totality
of the circumstances test that focuses on the adverse legal interests of the
two parties.8 The Federal Circuit has since applied the totality of the
circumstances test in the pivotal SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics
case,9 which indicates that the Federal Circuit has interpreted the
MedImmune decision to require a totality of the circumstances analysis
for declaratory judgment actions in all patent suits. In finding that an
actual controversy under Article III existed, the Federal Circuit held that
a promise by the declaratory judgment defendant not to sue did not
eliminate an actual controversy. 0
The primary focus of this Note is to address the impact of the
totality of circumstances test, as now adopted by the Federal Circuit, on
covenants not to sue." Under the old reasonable-apprehension test,
promises not to sue were given greater weight than under the new
totality of the circumstances test." Part I of this Note addresses the new
totality of the circumstances test under MedImmune and SanDisk." Part
II of this Note begins by analyzing the application of promises not to sue
prior to the MedImmune and SanDisk decisions and then compares the
weight given to the same promises in a post-Medlmmune world.
Although the current case law does not indicate an extreme change from
6. Id.
7. 549 U.S. at 132 n.Ii.
8. Id. at 127 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
9. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
io. Id. at 1382-83.
ii. This Note does not distinguish between covenants not to sue and promises not to sue, and will
treat the two identically. The equal treatment of these two instruments seems fair in light of the
Federal Circuit treating promises not to sue and covenants not to sue as equally enforceable in certain
situations. See Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Additionally, Black's Law Dictionary fails to provide a definition for a promise not to sue and defines
a covenant to sue as "[a] covenant in which a party having a right of action agrees not to assert that
right in litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 391 (8Th ed. 2004). Black's then references JOHN D.
CALAMARI & JOSH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §21-II, at 878-79 (3d ed. 1987), explaining that
a "covenant not to sue is a promise by the creditor not to sue either permanently or for a limited
period." See BLACK's LAW DICIONARY, supra, at 391. By defining a covenant not to sue as a promise not
to sue, Black's Law Dictionary further supports an equal treatment of both instruments.
12. See infra Part IB.
13. See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. ii8, 127 (2oo7).
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the pre-Medlmmune decisions, the dicta in these cases indicate that a
more extreme change may be forthcoming. 4 Finally, Part III responds to
a number of scholarly articles that have indicated disapproval of the
Federal Circuit's application of the totality of the circumstances test" and
explains why such criticism may be appropriate in certain situations but
not in others.
1. MEDIMMUNE AND SANDISK ALTER THE LANDSCAPE OF ACTUAL
CONTROVERSIES IN THE PATENT CONTEXT
In MedImmune v. Genentech, the Supreme Court addressed
whether an actual controversy existed even if the declaratory judgment
plaintiff was still paying licensing fees to the declaratory judgment
defendant. 6 In prior cases, the Federal Circuit had held that continuation
of license payments prevented a plaintiff from having a "reasonable
apprehension of a lawsuit" and thus an actual controversy as required
under Article II.1 The Supreme Court's MedImmune decision marked a
momentous change in the patent licensing framework." Justice Scalia
stated that a declaratory judgment plaintiff may bring a suit even if the
plaintiff continues to make licensing payments because it is unreasonable
to make "the plaintiff bet the farm, so to speak, by taking the violative
action" of ceasing to make licensing payments." Justice Scalia went even
further in footnote ii of the MedImmune opinion, where he criticized
the Federal Circuit's reasonable-apprehension test.'
Following the MedImmune decision, the Federal Circuit discarded
its reasonable-apprehension test and held that "[t]he Supreme Court's
opinion in MedImmune represents a rejection of our reasonable
apprehension of suit test."2' The Federal Circuit stated:
We need not define the outer boundaries of declaratory judgmentjurisdiction, which will depend on the application of the principles of
declaratory judgment jurisdiction to the facts and circumstances of
each case. We hold only that where a patentee asserts rights under a
patent based on certain identified ongoing or planned activity of
14. See infra Part II.C, D.
15. See, e.g., Katherine A. Helm & Gene W. Lee, Call It a Comeback: A Sweeping Change in the
Law on Declaratory Judgment Actions Against Patent Owners, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 231
(2008); Jennifer R. Saionz, Note, Declaratory Judgment Actions in Patent Cases: The Federal Circuit's
Response to MedImmune v. Genentech, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (2008).
16. 549 U.S. at 120-21.
17. Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Fina Research,
S.A. v. Baroid Ltd., 141 F-3d 1479, 1483-84 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase
Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, lo58 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
18. See Saionz, supra note 15, at 192.
19. Medimmune, 549 U.S. at 129.
20. Id. at 132fl.1II.
21. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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another party, and where that party contends that it has the right to
engage in the accused activity without license, an Article III case or
controversy will arise and the party need not risk a suit for
infringement by engaging in the identified activity before seeking a
declaration of its legal rights."
The language of SanDisk does not establish the outer boundaries of
what would suffice for a declaratory judgment action.23 However, the
Federal Circuit indicated that the analysis must focus on the adverse
interests of the parties as indicated by the conflicting rights asserted by
the parties.24 According to the new standard, actual infringement on the
part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff is unnecessary, rather, even
"planned activity" may constitute grounds for finding an actual
controversy.25
The concurring opinion of SanDisk went so far as to say that
it would appear that under the court's standard virtually any invitation
to take a paid license relating to the prospective licensee's activities
would give rise to an Article III case or controversy if the prospective
licensee elects to assert that its conduct does not fall within the scope
of the patent. Indeed, as the court makes clear, even a representation by
the patentee that it does not propose to file suit against the prospective
licensee will not suffice to avoid the risk that the patentee will face a
declaratory judgment action.6
The concurrence further stated that this new application of the rule
would cause a "sweeping change" in the law. Under the new standard,
the balance of power has greatly shifted from the licensor to the licensee
because the licensee may seek a declaratory judgment afainst the
licensor to prove patent invalidity or noninfringement. As the
concurring opinion indicates, even a promise not to sue provides less
immunity in this post-MedImmune world."
II. COVENANTS NOT TO SUE: BEFORE AND AFTER MEDIMMUNE
A. INTRODUCTION TO COVENANTS NOT TO SUE
To establish jurisdiction under a declaratory judgment action, "[a]n
actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at
the time the complaint is filed."30 This implies that if the actual
22. Id. at 1381.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 1382.
25. Id. at 1381.
26. Id. at 1384 (Bryson, J., concurring in the result) (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 1385.
28. See Saionz, supra note 15, at 192.
29. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 5384 (Bryson, J., concurring).
30. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 85 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting
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controversy is destroyed by some future action then the court may lose
subject matter jurisdiction over the issue. In a number of cases,
covenants not to sue have successfully destroyed the actual controversy
and limited the courts' declaratory judgment jurisdiction." The
interesting facet of this legal trend is the effect of the new declaratory
judgment standard on covenants not to sue in future court decisions.
Specifically, covenants not to sue seem to be at the intersection of the
two prongs of the old Federal Circuit test. A covenant not to sue
implicates both (i) the old reasonable-apprehension prong, and (2) the
actually-infringing-activity prong necessary for an actual controversy.3 2
Numerous scholars have indicated that the new declaratory judgment
standard will enable more declaratory judgment suits because of its
rejection of the reasonable-apprehension prong as previously applied by
the Federal Circuit." However, these scholars have not addressed the
implication of the new declaratory judgment standard on covenants not
to sue.34
The following sections include a fact-intensive exploration of
important declaratory judgment cases involving covenants not to sue
while applying the reasonable-apprehension test (pre-Medimmune) and
compare them to more recent decisions applying the totality of the
circumstances test (post-Medlmmune). I will argue that although the
post-Medlmmune decisions would have likely been decided in a similar
manner even under the pre-Medlmmune standard, the factual scenarios
in the post-MedImmune cases were such that they required a similar
result under both standards." However, I will also argue that the dicta in
these post-MedImmune cases indicate that under certain factual
scenarios, a different decision would result under the reasonable-
apprehension standard than would result under the totality of the
circumstances test. Furthermore, I will explain that under certain factual
scenarios, a covenant not to sue provides less protection under the new
totality of the circumstances test, which will lead to, as scholars have
predicted,36 a more lax standard for declaratory judgment. Finally, in Part
III of this Note, I will explain why, contrary to some scholars' opinions,37
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)); see also Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d
1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452. 459 n.Io. (1974)).
31. See, e.g., Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 470, 476 (E.D. Va. 2005).
32. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1379.
33. See, e.g., Helm & Lee, supra note 15, at 246.
34. See id.
35. See generally Michael A. Ladra & Lillian Ewing, Declaratory Judgment Practices After
SanDisk v. STMicroelectronics, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. I15 (2007) (explaining
that little has changed following Medlmmune).
36. See, e.g., Saionz, supra note i5, at 192.
37. See id.; see also Helm & Lee, supra note 15, at 246.
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the more lax declaratory judgment standard will ensure a more
competitive environment for smaller companies and limit the troll-like
antics of license-holding companies.
B. COVENANTS NOT TO SUE BEFORE MEDIMMUNE
In the 1995 Federal Circuit decision Super Sack Manufacturing
Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., the court held that a promise not to sue
divested the court of subject matter jurisdiction by eliminating a present
controversy.'5 Super Sack had initially asserted its patent rights against
Chase, but then subsequently made a promise not to sue Chase for any
past or present infringements or for identical products to the ones sold at
that time.39 The Federal Circuit stated that the "second part of our test of
declaratory justiciability respecting patent rights requires that the
putative infringer's 'present activity' place it at risk of infringement
liability."40 The court specifically explained that by promising not to
assert its patent rights against the past and present activity of Chase,
Super Sack had eliminated Chase's risk of infringement liability.4 ' The
court maintained this reasoning despite Chase's argument that Super
Sack's promise only covered Chase's past and present activity, but not its
future activity.42 Chase argued that an actual controversy existed because
the promise not to sue did not cover Chase's future activity.4 However,
the Federal Circuit held that " [t]he residual possibility of a future
infringement suit based on Chase's future acts is simply too speculative a
basis for jurisdiction.""
The Federal Circuit further explained that Chase did not assert any
future planned activity,45 which would distinguish this case from a later
case, Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc.,46 on the facts.
However, the court stated that "Super Sack's promise not to sue renders
any past or present acts of infringement that Chase may or may not have
committed irrelevant to the question whether a justiciable controversy
remains." 47 This statement connotes that even if Chase conducted past
acts in preparation of future sales, this evidence would be irrelevant to
38. 57 F-3d 1054, £059 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
39. Id. at 1o56.
40. Id. at 059 (quoting BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1059-60.
43. Id. at 1059.
44. Id. at io6o.
45. Id. at 1o59-6o.
46. 556 F.3d 1294, 1295-96 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that an actual controversy existed because of
Revolution's planned future activity). This case is discussed in greater depth at footnotes 8o-96 and
accompanying text.
47. Super Sack, 57 F.3d at io~o.
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the question of the existence of a justiciable controversy, since the court
must focus on present infringing activity.8 Under this line of reasoning,
even if Chase had conducted past activity in preparation of some future
infringing act (e.g., building a manufacturing plant that would make
infringing products), this past activity would not be indicative of an
actual controversy, since Super Sack's promise rendered any past or
present acts of Chase "irrelevant to the question whether a justiciable
controversy remains."4 9 Therefore, although the facts in Super Sack differ
from those in Revolution and may explain the different results of the two
cases, a juxtaposition of the dicta from the two cases reveals their
inconsistency.
Four years after the Super Sack decision, the Federal Circuit
revisited covenants not to sue in the declaratory judgment context in
Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc."o This case demonstrates an
even more pronounced difference between the old reasonable-
apprehension test and the new post-Medimmune standard. As will be
explained later, the Amana case, unlike the Super Sack decision, would
have likely been decided differently in the post-Medlmmune world."
After unsuccessful licensing negotiations, Quadlux asserted that Amana
infringed its '005 patent and sent a warning letter to Amana indicating
that it was in violation of the patent and that Quadlux would enforce its
rights." Additionally, Quadlux terminated its contractual relationship
with three distributors because they were also associated with Amana.51
Quadlux indicated to these distributors that Amana was going to proceed
to make a copy of Quadlux's oven and, therefore, Quadlux was
terminating its contractual relationship with these distributors. In
response to the warning letter and other actions by Quadlux, Amana
filed a declaratory judgment suit in federal court alleging
noninfringement and patent invalidity of Quadlux's patent."5 Quadlux
then filed a declaration by its president and CEO that it would not assert
its patent rights for past or present activity of Amana that may have been
infringing activity.6
48. See id. at 1059.
49. Id. at xo6o.
50. 172 F-3d 852, 855 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
51. See infra Part IID.
52. Amana, 172 F.3d at 854-55.
53. Id. at 855.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. ("Quadlux filed a... declaration ... covenanting not to 'assert any claim of patent
infringement against Amana under [the 'oo5 patentj as it presently reads, with respect to any product
currently advertised, manufactured, marketed or sold by Amana, or any product which was advertised,
manufactured, marketed or sold by Amana prior to the date of this declaration.'" (third alteration in
480o [Vol. 61:473
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The Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Amana's
declaratory judgment suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Despite
Amana's contention "that the Quadlux covenant did not remove
Amana's reasonable apprehension of being sued with regard to its new
products 'in the pipeline,' but not advertised, manufactured, marketed,
or sold before the filing date,"'" the Federal Circuit, citing the Super Sack
decision, affirmed the notion "that a covenant not to sue for any
infringing acts involving products 'made, sold, or used' on or before the
filing date is sufficient to divest a trial court of jurisdiction over a
declaratory judgment action."" The court explained that an actual
controversy must be extant at all stages of litigation, and that in this
situation, as in Super Sack, the actual controversy had been eliminated
by the Quadlux covenant.t Therefore, the court held that Amana's
potentially infringing "pipeline" products were "too speculative a basis"
for determining whether an actual controversy existed.
This case, even more substantially than Super Sack, highlights the
basic doctrine of the reasonable apprehension test. Under the
reasonable-apprehension standard, the actual controversy was viewed as
entirely eliminated if the covenant not to sue covered all current
products.62 However, this type of policy puts the allegedly-infringing
party into a difficult situation. The patent-holding party can merely craft
a covenant not to sue the alleged infringer for current and past activity
and thus destroy jurisdiction on the current issue. The patent holder can
then wait and reassert its patent rights against the alleged infringer's
future products that were in the pipeline. The new totality of the
circumstances test may help the alleged infringer avoid this type of
situation. Before diving into the policy ramifications of the new rule, it is
important to look at the Federal Circuit decisions following the
MedImmune decision and to consider how the court has applied the new
rule differently from the prior cases just discussed.
C. COVENANTS NOT TO SUE AFTER MEDIMMUNE
This section will explore three important Federal Circuit decisions
following the MedImmune decision that also involve covenants not to
original)).
57. Id. at 857.
58. Id. at 855.
59. Id. (citing Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F-3d 1054, io6o (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
6o. Id. (citing Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 ('995)).
6i. Id. at 85-6
62. See Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1o59-
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sue. The first of these decisions is the SanDisk decision,6 in which the
Federal Circuit demonstrated its affirmation and interpretation of the
Supreme Court's MedImmune decision. The next case addressed is
Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., which also involves a covenant
not to sue.64 Finally, this section will address the most recent covenant
not to sue patent case, Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. ,65
and the important dicta contained within it.
The SanDisk decision is the Federal Circuit's first application of the
new declaratory judgment test following the MedImmune decision.
Although not the main focus of the decision, STMicroelectronics argued
that its promise not to sue SanDisk defeated declaratory judgment
jurisdiction."' The Federal Circuit, applying the new MedImmune
standard, concluded that STMicroelectronics's "statement that it does
not intend to sue does not moot the actual controversy created by its
acts."" The court did not explore the details of the promise not to sue,
but rather focused on the multiple meetings and negotiations between
the two parties.6' Even though STMicroelectronics provided a promise
not to sue to SanDisk, the totality of the circumstances indicated that an
actual controversy still existed. 0 This type of analysis is to some extent in
conflict with the analyses in Amana and Super Sack because the court
shifts its focus of analysis to additional factors and not just the promise
not to sue. However, SanDisk would have likely been decided in the
same fashion even under the old reasonable-apprehension test." The
Federal Circuit later explained its decision in SanDisk by clarifying that
the promise not to sue in SanDisk "only stated that it did not intend to
sue SanDisk; it did not say it would not sue SanDisk in the future for its
alleged infringement." 2 Nonetheless, SanDisk represents a marked
63. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics. Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
64. 495 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
65. 556 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
66. See supra Part I.
67. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1383.
68. Id. (citing Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
69. Id. at 1382.
70. See id. at 1383. The court provided a number of factors that it said should be considered when
viewing the totality of the circumstances. See id. at 1378. However, the most important factor was the
multiple meetings between the two parties. See id. at 1382.
71. In SanDisk, STMicroelectronics made the unequivocal statement that it had "absolutely no
plan whatsoever to sue SanDisk." Id. The court held that STMicroelectronics's "statement that it does
not intend to sue does not moot the actual controversy created by its acts." Id. at 1383 (citing Md. Cas.
Co., 312 U.S. at 273). Although this important dicta indicates a marked change from the reasonable-
apprehension test, it may be that the lack of specificity in the promise not to sue made it less binding
and thus prevented the promise from mooting the controversy.
72. Benitec Austl. Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 134o. 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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change in the analysis of declaratory judgment cases and the relevant
role of promises not to sue in finding an actual controversy.
Another recent case indicating the lack of change between the pre-
and post-Medlmmune standards is Benitec Australia v. Nucleonics. In this
case, Nucleonics was developing RNAi medication for treating Hepatitis
B, and the new technology allegedly infringed Benitec's patent.73 The
court noted that "[i]n its appellee's brief, Benitec 'covenants and
promises not to sue Nucleonics for patent infringement arising from
activities and/or products occurring on or before the date dismissal was
entered in this action... ."' The court held that a controversy did not
arise because the covenant not to sue covered any infringing activity, and
because Nucelonics' research was acceptable under a statutory
exception." Nucleonics further contended that even if its research for a
human drug was covered by a statutory exception, Nucleonics intended
to conduct animal testing and develop animal products using the same
technology. 6 Nucleonics argued that this type of activity would be
infringing and that an actual controversy existed." The Federal Circuit
concluded that this was not sufficient evidence of an actual controversy
because: (i) there was no direct evidence of Nucleonics conducting
animal research and therefore it was too speculative, (2) the research
might be covered under a statutory exception, and (3) the covenant not
to sue covered an infringing activity that may have caused an actual
controversy." Interestingly, the dissent noted the following:
Benitec stated that it would not sue "for any research that was going on
prior to the dismissal" or "for animal research that was done at the
time of the dismissal." Notably, Benitec offered no covenant with
respect to future human or animal products or animal research.
The majority holds that Nucleonics has the burden of demonstrating
a continuing case or controversy as narrowed by Benitec's promises."
Ultimately, Benitec did not succeed in showing an actual controversy,
thus demonstrating a limited departure on declaratory judgment
jurisdiction.
On February 13, 2009, the Federal Circuit decided Revolution
Eyewear v. Aspex Eyewear, which is the most recent Federal Circuit
decision addressing covenants not to sue in the declaratory judgment
73. Id. at 1342; see Andrew Fire et al., Potent and Specific Genetic Interference by Double-
Stranded RNA in Caenorhabditis Elegans. 391 NATURE 8o6 (1998) (explaining RNA interference
("RNAi")).
74. Benitec, 495 F-3d at 1343.
75. Id. at 1346.
76. Id. at 1348-
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1348-49.
79 Id. at 1352 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
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context.to The court correctly applied the totality of the circumstances
test, and although it may have been decided similarly under the
reasonable-apprehension test, the dicta in the case clearly indicate a
departure from the past standards in the covenant not to sue arena. In
the Revolution case, Revolution sued Aspex for infringing its eyeglasses
patent."' Aspex then filed a declaratory judgment suit for
noninfringement against Revolution.2 In an attempt to settle the issue
and destroy the actual controversy necessary for jurisdiction under a
declaratory )udgment action, Revolution signed a covenant not to sue
with Aspex. The covenant stated that Revolution would not sue Aspex
for past or present infringement; however, the covenant did not extend
to future activity or to continued production of current products." Not
covering resumed production of current products was detrimental to
Revolution's claim because, in this particular situation, Aspex intended
to resume production of glasses that allegedly infringed Revolution's
patent." Therefore, if Aspex decided to sell these glasses at a later point
(which it intended to do), it would infringe the Revolution patent and
subject itself to further litigation.8
The Federal Circuit explained that "Aspex's declaratory action is
not a request for an 'advisory opinion' sought by a would-be future
competitor; it meets the MedImmune requirement of 'sufficient
immediacy and reality,' when the entirety of the circumstances are
considered."" This ruling distinguishes the case from other cases in which
the Federal Circuit had found that covenants not to sue destroyed
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.8 " Therefore, one could argue that the
only reason the case was decided differently from the pre-Medlmmune
decisions is because the Revolution covenant did not cover resumed
production of current products, which therefore maintained the
immediacy of the controversy. As will be explained below, although this
is an accurate and important point, the post-Medlmmune standard likely
did have an impact on the Revolution decision.
8o. Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 556 F.3d 1294, I295 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
8 1. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1295-96.
84. See id. at 1296 ("Revolution and counter-defendant Gary Zelman hereby unconditionally
covenant not to sue Aspex for patent infringement under the '913 patent based upon any activities
and/or products made, used, or sold on or before the dismissal of this action (03-5965 case).").
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1299 (citation omitted) (quoting Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 549 U.S. 1u8, 127
(2007)).
88. See, e.g., Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 470. 476 (E.D. Va. 2005).
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The impact of the new totality of the circumstances test first comes
to light in the dicta of the Revolution decision. The Federal Circuit began
by explaining that even in the post-MedImmune world, an "actual
controversy must be extant at all stages of review."8' However, the court
then further explained that the MedImmune decision
did change the Federal Circuit's rule that there must be either actual
infringement or active preparation to infringe accompanied by a
reasonable apprehension of imminent suit, for those circumstances
were not present on the facts of MedImmune. Instead, the Court
imposed a totality-of-the-circumstances test for deciding whether there
is indeed an actual controversy, on the particular facts and
relationships involved. 0
The implications of this statement may seem subtle at first, but they
have important ramifications in the context of promises not to sue. In
Revolution, the covenant not to sue had eliminated Aspex's "reasonable
apprehension of imminent suit" because Aspex was not currently
manufacturing the infringing product.9 ' Therefore, at the point that
Revolution signed the covenant, there was not an imminent fear of suit,
since Aspex was not currently producing the glasses. However, the court
rightfully decided that even though Aspex was not currently producing
the glasses, there was still an actual controversy in light of the totality of
the circumstances." The court explained that Aspex intended to resume
production of the infringing glasses and that the covenant not to sue did
not cover the current products. Additionally, the court also explained
that the interaction between the two parties-they were in ongoing
infringement litigation-must also be considered.94 Thus, the totality of
the circumstances raised an actual controversy, even though there was no
fear of imminent suit at the time the covenant not to sue was signed by
Revolution. 5
One could argue that under the facts of Revolution, an actual
controversy would also have been found under the reasonable-
apprehension test, since the resumption of glasses production by Aspex
was not speculative. 6 However, the Federal Circuit has not adopted this
reasoning. Furthermore, even if the Federal Circuit would have reached
a similar result under the facts of Revolution, the dicta of Revolution
89. Revolution, 556 F.3d at 1297.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 13oo.
93. Id. at 1298.
94. Id. at 1299.
95. Id. at I300.
96. But see Benitec Austi. Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 134o, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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indicate that different considerations are at play under the new totality of
the circumstances test.
In conclusion, the post-Medimmune decisions involving a promise
not to sue have so far had factual scenarios that could have been decided
similarly under both the pre- and post-MedImmune standards. However,
the dicta in the post-MedImmune decisions indicate that a different
analysis now follows whenever the Federal Circuit addresses declaratory
judgments and that this different reasoning applies equally in the context
of covenants not to sue. 97
D. ADVOCATING A BROAD TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCEs TEST FOR
PIPELINE PRODUCTS
This section begins by reviewing the facts of the Amana case and
explaining why a different result may have ensued under the post-
MedImmune totality of the circumstances standard. The post-
MedImmune decisions have not made a marked departure from the pre-
MedImmune decisions, at least in the covenant not to sue context.
However, the similar results-despite the two differing standards-are
most likely a result of the differing factual scenarios of the cases, not
continued adherence to the old test. One can view the change in the
declaratory judgment landscape by looking at the dicta in the decisions.
Under the new totality of the circumstances test, a covenant not to sue
can still eliminate an actual controversy, but now this outcome is more
difficult to obtain because additional factors must also be taken into
account. In Amana, prior to the MedImmune decision, the Federal
Circuit held that an actual controversy had been eliminated because the
97. For example, the dissent in Benitec explained that the majority incorrectly applied the totality
of the circumstances test. Id. at 1355 (Dyk, J., dissenting) ("The effect of today's decision is to limit the
availability of declaratory jurisdiction to challenge invalid and unenforceable patents by allowing
patentees to moot such controversies by dismissing the original infringement action and covenanting
not to bring suit on existing products, without any showing that the controversy will not recur in the
future.").
98. Compare Amana Refrigeration Corp. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F-3d 852, 855 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("Amana argues that the Quadlux covenant did not remove Amana's reasonable apprehension of
being sued with regard to its new products 'in the pipeline,' but not advertised, manufactured,
marketed, or sold before the filing date. However, an actual controversy cannot be based on a fear of
litigation over future products."), with Revolution, 556 F.3d 1294. 1299 (-Revolution's proposition that
for a justiciable controversy to exist, Aspex must reinstitute manufacture and sale of the [disputed
product] before it can test the patent, and risk being held a w Illful infringer subject to treble damages
if the test fails, raises a question for which MedImmune counsels thoughtful review of the entirety of
the circumstances. Aspex maintains that it has the right to make and sell the disputed eyewear
products because the '913 patent is invalid or unenforceable. The planned activity is not
speculative.. .. Thus, Aspex's declaratory action is not a request for an 'advisory opinion' sought by a
would-be future competitor; it meets the MedImmune requirement of 'sufficient immediacy and
reality,' when the entirety of the circumstances are considered.") (citation omitted)).
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covenant not to sue covered past and current products.9 9 Thus, a
reasonable apprehension was no longer present because Amana could
not be subject to litigation after the covenant not to sue was signed.'
Based on the dicta in the SanDisk and Revolution opinions, it is
highly possible that Amana would have been decided differently for a
number of reasons. First, based on the facts of Amana, the declaratory
judgment plaintiff indicated that it believed an actual controversy still
existed with regard to its products that were "in the pipeline."'o' These
were products planned by the company that had not yet been
manufactured or advertised and were therefore not covered by the
covenant not to sue.' 2 Additionally, the patentee had notified
distributors that it was terminating their agreements because of their
relationship with Amana. 3 This is an additional factor indicating the
adverse relationship between the two parties. Under the new declaratory
judgment standard, the totality of the circumstances must be taken into
account.0 4 Therefore, the covenant not to sue would not have the same
conclusive effect now that it did under the reasonable-apprehension test.
Under the new standard, it is highly plausible that the court could decide
that under the totality of the circumstances (i.e., consideration of the
adverse relationship of the two parties and the pipeline products), an
actual controversy continues to exist, even though a covenant not to sue
was filed by the patentee. Of course, this analysis is speculative, and it is
also possible that the Federal Circuit would reach a similar result in the
Amana case under the new totality of the circumstances test.
Although it would not be completely surprising if the Federal
Circuit were to find that the covenant not to sue in Amana eliminated the
actual controversy, under the new totality of the circumstances test, there
are strong arguments against the court reaching such a result.
Specifically, Amana's contention that the covenant not to sue did not
cover products it had in its pipeline should be given substantial weight in
determining the presence of an actual controversy. The SanDisk decision
stated that
where a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain
identified ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where that
party contends that it has the right to engage in the accused activity
without license, an Article III case or controversy will arise and the
99. Amana, 172 F.3d at 855.
' oo. Id.
iox. Id.
102. Id.
I1o3. Id.
104. Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. xx8, 127 (2007) (citing Md. Gas. Co. v. Pac.
Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941))-
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party need not risk a suit for infringement by engagin in the identified
activity before seeking a declaration of its legal rights. s
The SanDisk dicta indicate that the Federal Circuit has interpreted
the Supreme Court to accept the proposition that an actual controversy
can exist even when the allegedly-infringing party is only planning to
conduct the infringing activity." However, the dicta in SanDisk and
Revolution only address the specific situation in which the patentee has
asserted its patent rights against the planned activity of another party,
and does not address the same situation present in Amana. The
hypothetical below should shed light on the facts of the Amana scenario,
but in broader terms.
Imagine the hypothetical scenario in which the patentee asserts its
patent rights against the alleged infringer for product X. The alleged
infringer then files a declaratory judgment suit for noninfringement
against the patentee. To avoid litigation, the patentee then signs a
covenant not to sue and promises not to assert its patent rights for any
past or present products marketed by the alleged infringer.
Unbeknownst to the patentee, the alleged infringer has product X2 in the
pipeline. Because X2 is in the pipeline, the alleged infringer wishes to
continue its declaratory judgment suit for noninfringement to open up
the avenue for future marketing of this pipeline product.
The MedImmune dicta can be applied to the hypothetical scenario
in both a broad and narrow way. Under the narrow application, an actual
controversy would not exist because the patentee did not assert its patent
rights against the planned activity of X2. This narrow interpretation of
the dicta in MedImmune would lead to the same result as the court
reached in the Amana decision. If, on the other hand, courts interpret the
language in the MedImmune decision more broadly, a different result
may follow. Courts could interpret the language of the decision to mean
that an actual controversy exists even for the planned activity of the
alleged infringer. Specifically, in the scenario where the patentee has
asserted its rights for one activity, it seems likely that the patentee would
assert its rights for similar activity later down the line.0' Therefore, in
determining if an actual controversy exists, a court should find little
relevance in the patentee's limited awareness of only one of the ongoing
activities or planned activities when writing its initial brief to the court.
105. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (emphasis
added).
io6. 549 U.S. at 132.
107, One counterargument to this reasoning is that if the party settled with a covenant not to sue
for the current infringing product. then it would be likely to sign an additional covenant not to sue for
the later product, if the situation did arise. This may be true, but the alleged infringer has the right to
establish its legal status via court opinion.
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This type of broad interpretation of the MedImmune dicta has
important policy implications, specifically in the context of pipeline
inventions. First, it is likely that if a company is already in the field of
producing product X, its later generation X2 and X3 would also likely be
covered by the patentee's patent that covered product X. Thus, it would
be beneficial for the allegedly-infringing company to have the
declaratory judgment suit heard at its initial filing and not postponed
until a later time. If the courts adopt this type of approach, they will help
clear the legal cloud over the allegedly-infringing company and thus
improve its marketability for investors and its potential for growth.
These important policy considerations, which when taken into account
with the policy arguments in Part III of this Note, support the notion that
in certain situations, a covenant not to sue for past and present activity
may not suffice to eliminate an actual controversy if there are pipeline
products.
Nonetheless, this type of consideration is not free of criticism.0 8 An
important factor in analyzing these so-called pipeline products is the
allegedly-infringing company's level of investment into product X2. IS
product X2 a completely speculative product or has the company already
invested resources in the development of this future product? This would
require a factual inquiry into the business of the allegedly-infringing
company and thus require more time and resources from the court
system. However, the courts could avoid bearing the extra burden of the
factual inquiry by placing the onus of providing the factual records on the
party asserting that it intends to release product X2 in the future. By
placing the burden on the allegedly-infringing company, the infringing
party would have to consider whether or not the continuation of the
declaratory judgment litigation was really in its favor. Intuitively, it
seems that if the allegedly-infringing company believes that it should
continue pursuing its declaratory judgment suit because of pipeline
products, then a covenant not to sue provided by the patentee should not
prevent the alleged infringer from having its legal rights ascertained by
the court.'
io8. Another criticism of an easier declaratory judgment standard is that it requires additional
litigation in general, which requires additional resources from the court system.
1o9. The hypothetical scenario discussed above can be further developed by adding an additional
caveat. Imagine that the alleged infringer, who wishes to continue litigation on its pipeline product,
sends a letter to the patentee stating that it will continue to develop and eventually sell pipeline
products X2 and X3. By sending such a letter the alleged infringer would provide tangible evidence
that an actual controversy continues to exist even if a covenant not to sue covering the current
products has been signed. This variation of the hypothetical is distinct from the original hypothetical,
and courts may be more inclined to find that an actual controversy continues to exist. However, the
fundamental analysis of the immediacy of the actual controversy would still be applied, and courts
could still find this letter of intent insufficient to maintain the actual controversy.
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III. THE NEw DECLARATORY JUDGMENT STANDARD AND ITS IMPACT ON
LICENSING AGREEMENTS
A. PURIFYING THE PATENT SYSTEM OF INVALID PATENTS
The new declaratory judgment standard adopted by the Federal
Circuit as a result of MedImmune will have an impact on the license
negotiation field."" A number of commentators have indicated
disapproval of the new standard and have explained that the new more
lax standard for establishing jurisdiction in declaratory judgment actions
will lead to difficulty in patent license negotiations."' These articles argue
that companies will not be able to negotiate the terms of license
agreements because they will have to worry about the consequences of a
declaratory judgment suit that could lead to the invalidity of their
patents." 2 These arguments are more convincing in light of the patent
landscape in recent years. After the Supreme Court's decision in KSR
International, Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.," prior-art searches have made
proving invalidity of patents via obviousness arguments much more
prevalent."4 This has further resulted in many patents being found
invalid."' Some scholars have argued that the company with the greatest
amount of resources will triumph by conducting more in-depth prior-art
searches."' Under a more lax standard for jurisdiction, these companies
will have to worry that their patents will be subjected to invalidity suits,
which are becoming ever more successful in recent years."' Therefore,
no. "[T]he rule adopted by the court in this case will effect a sweeping change in our law
regarding declaratory judgment jurisdiction. . . .I agree with the court that a fair reading of footnote
ii of the Supreme Court's opinion in MedImmune compels that result...." SanDisk Corp. v.
STMicroelectronics, Inc. 480 F.3d 1372, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Bryson, J., concurring).
i it. See, e.g., Helm & Lee, supra note 15, at 245; Saionz, supra note 15, at 192.
112. Supra note iii.
113. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415-22 (2007).
I 14. Keith L. Slenkovich, The Changing Landscape of Obviousness in the Wake of KSR. in 2ND
ANNUAL PATENT LAW INSTITUTE, at 431 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 14506, 2008) ("[T]he KSR decision appears to have had a meaningful
impact of increasing determinations of patent obviousness [in bench trials].").
1I5. Harold C. Wegner, Making Sense of KSR and Other Recent Patent Cases, lo6 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 39, 41, http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/volio6/wegner.pdf ("As
a result [of KSR], inventions that were nonobvious the day before KSR suddenly became obvious to
this modern man of ordinary skill in the art.").
i16. "A rough estimate may be that half of the cost of patent litigation-$1.o5 billion per year-is
attributable to disputes over the validity or enforceability due to inequitable conduct of the patents in
suit," Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1503 (2001).
Since a validity dispute will in most cases involve prior art searches, one can conclude that a party with
"deeper pockets" will have more success in such disputes because of the high costs attributable to this
aspect of patent litigation.
I17. Lee Petherbrid ge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical
Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEx. L. REV. 2051. 2055 (2007) ('The Federal Circuit finds
patents obvious a clear majority of the time. Overall, about 58% of all analyses result in a finding of
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these companies will be more hesitant to obtain license agreements from
infringers and will thus make less profit off of their patents. The
downstream effect of such a practice is that patents as a whole will
become less valuable because companies will be more reluctant to try to
obtain licenses.
However, this line of argument is open to objection on a number of
grounds. First, one can argue that it is for the benefit of the patent system
that it be easier to obtain jurisdiction under a declaratory judgment
standard. One line of reasoning in favor of a more lax declaratory
judgment standard in the patent context is that it will encourage the
purification of the patent system."8 By providing alleged infringers with
the right to assert their legal rights and challenge the infringement suit,
the new declaratory judgment standard has made it possible for the
infringers to also challenge the validity of the patent. Then, if a patent is
not actually valid, the patent system will be purged of these invalid
patents (whether for obviousness or on other grounds).
In support of the argument that these post-Medlmmune standards
will purify the patent system, one should also take into account the
following: Under the new declaratory judgment standard, it is easier for
an alleged infringer to bring an invalidity suit against the patentee.
Therefore, a patentee will only assert its rights if it is certain that it has a
valid patent. Thus, the argument that companies will be hesitant to enter
licensing negotiations does not apply to all situations, since individuals
who know that they have valid or relatively strong patents will not be
wary of potential invalidity suits. Additionally, the actual patent statute
indicates that a patent is presumed valid." 9
B. FoUR BARGAINING SCENARIOS: AN ANALYSIS OF EXPOSED REVENUES
AND BURDENSOME LITIGATION COSTS
The final portion of this Note will present four potential bargaining
scenarios that may arise. For simplicity's sake, the hypothetical scenarios
will assume only two types of companies: large companies and small
companies."' Assuming only these two types of companies, there are four
potential bargaining scenarios. Under the first scenario, a large company
patentee attempts to license the invention to a small company. Under the
second scenario, two large companies are negotiating a licensing
agreement. Under the third scenario, a small company patentee attempts
obviousness; this trend has been increasing since 1990. This ratio does not seem to be associated with
broad technological areas.").
118. See Helm & Lee, supra note 15, at 231.
'19. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
120. Large companies are assumed to have substantially greater financial resources than small
companies.
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to license the invention to a large company. Finally, under the fourth
scenario, two small companies are negotiating a licensing agreement.
The breakdown of the bargaining parties into these two groups is
important for the final analysis of the new, more lax declaratory
judgment standard. In undertaking this four-scenario analysis, two
factors must be considered simultaneously. First, one must consider the
issue of exposed revenues (i.e., the value of the business enterprise and
how deep its pockets are). This Note discusses and applies this factor in
greater detail below. Second, one must consider the issue of burdensome
litigation costs and the ability of a large company to overwhelm a smaller
company with exorbitant legal fees. These two factors may swing in
different directions depending on the parties involved in the hypothetical
license negotiation.
Under scenario one (large company patentee and small company
licensee), the main benefit from the more lax declaratory judgment
standard comes from an analysis of exposed revenues. Hypothetically
speaking, a more established company will have a larger patent portfolio,
more robust exposed revenues than a smaller company, and,
consequently, more to lose. In light of the more lax declaratory judgment
standard, patentees with greater exposed revenue may become more
hesitant to assert their patent rights, since companies now have a greater
risk of losing their patents. On the other hand, companies will likely
assert their patent rights against companies that have large exposed
revenue because then the patentees will have the opportunity to generate
the greatest revenue from a licensing agreement. Basically, a company
would rather assert its patent rights to gain a license from a large
company like the maker of Blackberry 2 ' than against a smaller company
which no one has heard of and does not yet sell its product on the
market. The answer seems clear. Under the more lax declaratory
judgment standard, larger companies will have to make a careful cost-
benefit analysis before they assert their patent rights because they have
more exposed revenue to lose. Additionally, patentees will likely refrain
from asserting their patent rights against smaller companies because
these smaller companies have less money to pay under licensing
agreements and because the larger companies would rather minimize
exposing risk to their patents.
Now imagine the hypothetical scenario of two large companies
(scenario two). Large company A ("MacroSoft") believes that large
company B ("Max") is infringing its patent and sends Max a letter
indicating interest in setting up a license agreement.m' Max could
121. See, e.g., NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1290-91 (Fed. Cit. 2005).
122. IBM makes over $x billion a year in patent licensing royalties and has made it a company
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proceed to establish jurisdiction under the new declaratory judgment
standard and attempt to prove the invalidity of the asserted patent.
However, as a result of being a larger company, Max will likely have a
more robust patent portfolio and greater exposed revenue than a smaller
company. The combination of more exposed revenue and a more robust
patent portfolio makes the chance of a cross-license agreement between
MacroSoft and Max more likely than a cross-license agreement between
MacroSoft and a smaller company. The reason for this should be
obvious: Max likely has more relevant patents than a smaller company
and therefore will have more leverage. Furthermore, Max will be more
hesitant to go to court and risk losing its noninfringement law suit. In
conclusion, in scenarios like this one, it is more likely that a large
company would avoid a declaratory judgment suit because it would have
more robust exposed revenue and thus would not want to go into court
and risk its exposed revenue, when it can reach a cross-license
agreement.123
Although an analysis of the first two scenarios indicates that the
more lax declaratory judgment standard may have a favorable impact on
certain situations, the analysis of scenario three provides a much
different result. In scenario three, a small company holds a patent, and a
larger company is conducting allegedly-infringing activity. In this
scenario the issue of burdensome litigation truly rears its ugly head.
Imagine the following situation: a small company called Startup has
promising intellectual property but only limited funding to begin its
business. A large company called MacroSoft is conducting activity that
may infringe on Startup's intellectual property. If Startup attempts to
negotiate a licensing agreement with MacroSoft, then under the more lax
declaratory judgment standard, Startup is at a much higher risk of a
declaratory judgment suit. This is further complicated by the issue of
burdensome litigation. Since MacroSoft has potentially limitless funds
compared to Startup, MacroSoft can pursue a declaratory judgment suit
and finance the litigation without too much of an effort.I' However,
policy to obtain patents for the specific purpose of licensing them out. See KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID
KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE Arric: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTs 58 (2000).
123. This Note does not discuss hypothetical scenario four involving negotiations between two
small companies in detail. A similar analysis as applied to two large company negotiations can be
applied to the smaller company scenario since both parties are in an equal bargaining position with
regard to finances for litigation and exposed revenue. Both parties have little exposed revenue and are
therefore unfavorable potential licensees. More specifically, the minimal revenue generation of the
small company functions as a disincentive because the maximum net royalty payments are limited by
the net sales of the small company.
124. "The American Intellectual Property Law Association reports, based on a survey of its
members, that the median cost of patent litigation to each side is $799,000 through the end of
discovery, and $1,503,ooo through trial and appeal." Lemley, supra note IIr6, at 1502.
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Startup will have to divert its more limited and hence more valuable
finances to defending its intellectual property. As a result, Startup may
be more inclined to drop the licensing negotiation with MacroSoft out of
fear of the burdensome litigation costs. This scenario puts Startup at a
disadvantage because Startup will not be able to monetize its intellectual
property through licensing agreements with larger companies because of
fear of declaratory judgment litigation.
As these observations illustrate, the new declaratory judgment
standard leaves the court system in a better situation in certain scenarios
but not in others. The hypothetical MacroSoft will be more hesitant to
assert its patent rights against smaller companies that have less exposed
revenue. This makes sense because as discussed earlier, a smaller
company has a less robust patent portfolio, less exposed revenue, and
therefore provides less economic benefit to MacroSoft (while providing a
similar risk for a declaratory judgment suit). Similarly, the new standard
leaves smaller companies in a worse scenario when it comes to licensing
their inventions. As explored under the burdensome-litigation factor,
smaller companies may become more hesitant to enter licensing
negotiations with larger companies because of the risk of unwieldy
litigation costs. Consequently, the more lax declaratory judgment
standard puts licensors generally, whether large or small, in a more
difficult position.
Although this lax declaratory judgment standard seems to put small
licensors in an even more precarious situation than large licensors
because of the potential to overwhelm the small licensor with litigation
fees, this more lax standard still favors the smaller company. The primary
objective of a small company is not to monetize its intellectual property
through an aggressive licensing plan, but rather to develop a product
either independently or through the friendly licensing of its intellectual
property with an interested larger company. For example, a common
practice in the biotechnology industry is that in which many small
companies develop products at the cutting edge of science and then
license the intellectual property to a large company that will help
commercially develop the product (commonly through joint venture
agreements). Since this is the primary objective of small companies, the
fact that they may have difficulties attempting to aggressively license
their intellectual property should not weigh against the new declaratory
judgment standard. Rather, this shift of power will likely have the
greatest impact on patent troll companies, euphemistically referred to as
"license-holding companies." It is these types of companies that will feel
the greatest brunt of the new standard because the new declaratoryjudgment standard puts licensors generally in a more vulnerable position.
Since the primary business objective of the license-holding companies is
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to aggressively license their intellectually property, they will
consequently feel the greatest impact from the new standard.
CONCLUSION
The new patent licensing arena will enable smaller companies to
function with less fear of trivial licensing agreements. These smaller
companies will have less to fear because the new ease in establishing
declaratory judgment jurisdiction will ensure that larger companies, like
MacroSoft, do not assert their patent rights until there is sufficient
incentive to expose MacroSoft's patent to the risk of invalidity.
Additionally, license-holding companies will have less strength in their
licensing negotiations because of the risk of a declaratory judgment suit.
In the bigger picture, this may help smaller companies budget their
resources more efficiently, since they will not have to pay as many
onerous licensing fees. This will inevitably benefit the marketplace, since
competition and variety will ideally lead to greater innovation. The new
declaratory judgment standard may not only help purge the patent
system of invalid patents, but may also foster the development of smaller
companies and increase diversity in the world of technology companies.
In conclusion, if companies' primary purpose is developing technology,
as opposed to generating revenue through an aggressive licensing plan,
then the new declaratory judgment standard will help such companies
operate without fear of faulty license demands.
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